Miles Brundage

Beliefs Korrents

• Korrents What they believe 33 beliefs — each backed by an exact quote.

  Each is a korrent — compiled by korrents.com, not by them: the one-line wordings are korrents', the quotes are theirs.

  Recent

  • AI loss-of-control risk could materialize within years, not decades

    Loss of control is a risk for the next few years, not the next few decades as many experts once thought.

    My speech at Borgo Laudato Si’ Said 16 Jul 2026

    Full record — everyone who holds this →

  • AI capabilities are advancing faster than almost anyone anticipated

    AI is developing at a very rapid pace, far more rapidly than most outside of the industry fully understand, and far more rapidly than almost anyone in the industry predicted.

    My speech at Borgo Laudato Si’ Said 16 Jul 2026

    Full record — everyone who holds this →

  • Competitive pressure among AI developers could cause loss of control even without anyone intending it

    But in a climate of rushed decisions and fierce competition, we could lose control over AI even if almost no one wants that outcome.

    My speech at Borgo Laudato Si’ Said 16 Jul 2026

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  Show 30 more

  • Given the current pace of AI capabilities relative to governance, society will at best avoid only the worst-case outcomes, not the merely very bad ones.

    We need to accept that at best, we will just barely avoid some of the worst case scenarios (e.g., an AI-enabled biological weapon that kills billions, a rogue AI takeover, or stable global totalitarianism enabled by AI), given the current pace of AI capabilities relative to the pace of governance.

    We're in Triage Mode for AI Policy Said 22 Feb 2026

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  • Third-party frontier AI auditing is urgently needed and would help prevent extreme concentration of power.

    I think frontier AI auditing (covering both safety and security) is both urgently needed and doable, and can help avoid extreme concentration of power, since it introduces external oversight into the decision-making of people with a "country of geniuses in a datacenter" at their disposal.

    We're in Triage Mode for AI Policy Said 22 Feb 2026

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    data centers

  • Left to their own devices and under competitive pressure, companies will cut safety corners even when safer alternatives are possible.

    History has shown very extensively that, left to their own devices, even if something could be done safely, people in a hurry will find all sorts of ways to f*** things up.

    We're in Triage Mode for AI Policy Said 22 Feb 2026

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  • AI companies should not be the ones certifying their own safety and security practices

    In short, whether AI is a normal technology or an unusually dangerous one, it doesn't make sense for companies to check their own homework on safety and security.

    The Launch of AVERI Said 15 Jan 2026

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  • AI currently receives far less independent scrutiny than other technologies capable of comparably deadly single incidents

    Scrutiny applied to AI is way below other technologies that - even if you totally ignore the doomers - could put far fewer lives at risk than AI in a single incident.

    The Launch of AVERI Said 15 Jan 2026

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  • Public scrutiny of a new technology tends to jump only after a deadly incident, otherwise rising slowly over decades

    Scrutiny typically either jumps several points on any 10-point scale after an incident that kills a bunch of people, or increases very slowly over decades.

    The Launch of AVERI Said 15 Jan 2026

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  • Without agreed rules of the road, AI companies and states will tend to cut corners on safety and compliance commitments.

    Companies and countries are tempted to cut corners by default and would benefit from some rules of the road, at least if they're sure others will follow those rules.

    Some Recent Stuff I Wrote Said 25 Sept 2025

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  • AI capabilities will keep advancing rapidly, creating serious risks by default that can still be mitigated through deliberate foresight and action.

    the perspective I outline is very bullish on AI capabilities and very concerned about the risks which may arise by default, but also hopeful that, through foresight and vigorous action, we can mitigate the worst of these risks.

    Some Recent Stuff I Wrote Said 25 Sept 2025

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  • Applying AI to cyberdefense will help counter AI-powered cyberoffense.

    applying AI to cyberdefense will help us defend against AI that is leveraged for cyberoffense.

    Some Recent Stuff I Wrote Said 25 Sept 2025

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  • AI is becoming capable of synthesizing knowledge, one of the core functions megapapers serve.

    AI is increasingly adept at directly achieving some goals that megapapers help to achieve, such as synthesizing knowledge.

    Megapapers and How to Write Them Said 27 Aug 2025

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  • AI systems are not yet a substitute for real, diverse human experts.

    But they can't do everything that megapapers do, such as conveying intellectual heft and legitimacy, and they are not yet a replacement for real, diverse experts.

    Megapapers and How to Write Them Said 27 Aug 2025

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  • Changing societal outcomes requires changing minds, and the credibility many diverse co-authors lend to a conclusion is hard to replicate with AI.

    I think that changing societal outcome requires changing minds, and the "heft" that comes from many authors with different backgrounds endorsing a certain set of conclusions is hard to replicate with a link to a shared ChatGPT chat.

    Megapapers and How to Write Them Said 27 Aug 2025

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    OpenAI

  • Today's approach to frontier AI assessment is superficial last-minute product testing rather than real auditing, threatening safety, stability, and commercial adoption of AI

    The state-of-the-art today can be more accurately described as "last-minute, black-box product testing" rather than auditing, and I think this situation threatens public safety, international stability, and sustainable commercial adoption of AI.

    AI Auditing 2027 Said 16 Jul 2025

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  • Effective governance of frontier AI requires three things together: agreed safety standards, incentives for developers to follow them, and evidence that they are being followed.

    governing frontier AI requires standards for safety and security, incentives for the leading AI developers to follow those standards, and evidence that the standards are being followed.

    Standards, Incentives, and Evidence: The Frontier AI Governance Triad Said 19 Jun 2025

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  • As AI systems become more capable, the danger of false or unverifiable safety claims grows, pushing competing companies toward cutting corners.

    As AI gets more capable, the risks associated with mistaken claims, fraudulent claims, or too-vague-to-be-verified claims will increase, and a cloud of suspicion between competitors could drive corner-cutting (indeed, this is happening already and could get worse).

    Standards, Incentives, and Evidence: The Frontier AI Governance Triad Said 19 Jun 2025

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  • Strong whistleblower protections make the absence of visible whistleblowing meaningful evidence that a company is not committing flagrant violations.

    The stronger such policies are, the more "absence of evidence" (lack of visible whistleblowing or lawsuits) can become "evidence of absence" (regarding flagrant violations).

    Standards, Incentives, and Evidence: The Frontier AI Governance Triad Said 19 Jun 2025

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  • An international AI safety body modeled on the IAEA would not by itself be enough to prevent AI-related geopolitical crises.

    the current situation in Iran shows that even if an "IAEA for AI" is necessary for some purposes, it won't be sufficient for resolving the tricky geopolitical issues raised by AI.

    Iran and the opportunities and limits of an “IAEA for AI” Said 18 Jun 2025

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    AI alignment

  • The time between deciding to cross a dangerous AI capability threshold and actually crossing it could be extremely short, even seconds.

    With AI, breakout times could conceivably be very short - it could be hours, minutes, or even seconds for some very specific but important change to occur.

    Iran and the opportunities and limits of an “IAEA for AI” Said 18 Jun 2025

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  • Global computing supply chains are easier to monitor than nuclear supply chains because so few companies make the key equipment.

    I think computing supply chains are much easier to monitor than nuclear ones - there is only one TSMC and one ASML, but there are nine and maybe soon ten nuclear powers

    Iran and the opportunities and limits of an “IAEA for AI” Said 18 Jun 2025

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  • AI will eliminate many millions of jobs within the next few years, and that disruption will shape the politics of everything else about AI.

    I’m quite confident that AI will eliminate many millions of people’s jobs in the next few years.

    Some Very Important Things (That I Won't Be Working On This Year) Said 15 Feb 2025

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  • Companies do not have sufficient incentives to mitigate the major risks of AI, and competition between them is driving corner-cutting.

    Contrary to some people’s beliefs, companies do not in fact have sufficient incentives to mitigate all major risks, and competition is driving corner-cutting that needs to be reined in somehow.

    Some Very Important Things (That I Won't Be Working On This Year) Said 15 Feb 2025

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  • Any given AI capability becomes cheap and widely available within a couple of years of first being reached, so nobody can be kept away from it for long.

    Each and every time, it took at most a few years but typically months before other companies would achieve the same level of performance using a broadly similar, and always relatively simple, recipe.

    The Real Lesson of DeepSeek's R1 Said 2 Feb 2025

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  • The United States cannot hold a monopoly on superhuman AI, so competing with China has to be paired with coexisting with it.

    AI competition needs to be tempered with a recognition that China isn’t going away as a player in AI, and that coexistence must also be a part of America’s strategy.

    The Real Lesson of DeepSeek's R1 Said 2 Feb 2025

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    ChinaAmerica

  • AI progress is faster than people expect, and ordinary scaling can be enough to solve problems that looked very hard.

    GPT-2, R1, and nearly every other AI model released since 2018 have all been part of a consistent story: AI capabilities that rival and ultimately exceed human intelligence are easier and cheaper to build than almost anyone can intuitively grasp, and this gets easier and cheaper every month.

    The Real Lesson of DeepSeek's R1 Said 2 Feb 2025

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  • Securing model weights against theft is a more urgent policy priority than safety research, because security is built out of atoms and takes calendar time that safety does not.

    Increasing the incentive and technical ability of AI companies to have good security is a very high priority, and in my view even more urgent than safety (though that’s also very important).

    Why Security Comes First Said 10 Jan 2025

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  • AI companies will not fix their own security without outside pressure, because they bear the cost of investing and everyone else bears the cost of their not investing.

    And while the costs of investing in security are largely borne by the company, the costs of under-investing are borne by a much larger set of actors, e.g. perhaps the country or world as a whole.

    Why Security Comes First Said 10 Jan 2025

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  • Advanced AI is close enough that the preparations which take years have to be started now, whichever end of the expert range you believe.

    If there are ways that you can help improve the governance of AI in these and other countries, you should be doing it now or in the next few months, not planning for ways to have an impact several years from now.

    Time's Up for AI Policy Said 20 Dec 2024

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  • AI that exceeds human performance in nearly every cognitive domain is almost certain to be built within the next few years.

    AI that exceeds human performance in nearly every cognitive domain is almost certain to be built and deployed in the next few years.

    Time's Up for AI Policy Said 20 Dec 2024

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  • There is no private evidence behind frontier-lab confidence in fast AI progress; the evidence is public and outsiders have simply not absorbed it.

    There is no secret insight that frontier AI companies have which explains why people who work there are so bullish about AI capabilities improving rapidly in the next few years.

    Time's Up for AI Policy Said 20 Dec 2024

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  • Once model weights leave their owner's control the loss is irreversible, which is why securing them is the precondition for governing AI at all.

    If you can’t control where AI weights go (i.e., prevent leaking or theft), you can’t govern the technology.

    Time's Up for AI Policy Said 20 Dec 2024

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  Beliefs others hold too

  • Any given AI capability becomes cheap and widely available within a couple of years of first being reached, so nobody can be kept away from it for long. 3 hold this

    Each and every time, it took at most a few years but typically months before other companies would achieve the same level of performance using a broadly similar, and always relatively simple, recipe.

    The Real Lesson of DeepSeek's R1 Said 2 Feb 2025

    Full record — everyone who holds this →

  • AI progress is faster than people expect, and ordinary scaling can be enough to solve problems that looked very hard. 3 hold this

    GPT-2, R1, and nearly every other AI model released since 2018 have all been part of a consistent story: AI capabilities that rival and ultimately exceed human intelligence are easier and cheaper to build than almost anyone can intuitively grasp, and this gets easier and cheaper every month.

    The Real Lesson of DeepSeek's R1 Said 2 Feb 2025

    Full record — everyone who holds this →

  • Advanced AI is close enough that the preparations which take years have to be started now, whichever end of the expert range you believe. 2 hold this

    If there are ways that you can help improve the governance of AI in these and other countries, you should be doing it now or in the next few months, not planning for ways to have an impact several years from now.

    Time's Up for AI Policy Said 20 Dec 2024

    Full record — everyone who holds this →

  All 33 beliefs →